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R
ecent developments in Congress and the
courts have focused attention on the rela-
tive roles of commercial banks, thrifts,
and credit unions. As concern mounted last year
about the state of the thrift deposit insurance
fund, Congress required commercial banks to
share the burden of recapitalizing the fund. In
return, Congress promised to come up with a
plan for merging the bank and thrift charters, a
move the banking industry has long favored.
About the same time, a federal appeals court
ruled against a major source of credit union
growth since the early 1980s—the acceptance
of new members with a common bond different
from the original members. The Supreme Court
later agreed to hear the case, sparking a renewed
debate in Congress about the proper role of
credit unions in the financial system.
These recent actions by Congress and the
courts follow a decade and a half of dramatic
changes in the depository industry in Tenth Dis-
trict states. Some of these changes have been due
to shifts in laws and regulations. Others have
resulted from shocks to the regional and national
economy and long-run financial trends such as
the growth of secondary loan markets. While the
changes to the district depository industry have
been many and varied, four stand out. First, there
has been a significant decline in the number of
district depository institutions—a decline in
which banks, thrifts, and credit unions have all
shared. Second, total deposits have declined
when adjusted for inflation or measured relative
to economic activity. Third, the share of thrifts
in total deposits has plummeted relative to that
of banks and credit unions. And fourth, while
banks, thrifts, and credit unions still specialize
in different loans and investments, the three
types of institution do not look as different today
as at the beginning of the 1980s. 
Such changes are important because they
affect the thousands of depository institutions in
the district and the supply of credit and other
financial services to district households and
businesses. With those effects in mind, this arti-
cle shows how the district depository industry
has changed since 1979, explains the factors
behind each change, and suggests what further
changes may lie ahead. The first section docu-
ments and explains past changes. The second
section discusses future changes, focusing on
three forces that loom large in the period ahead:
the merger of the bank and thrift charters, the
debate over the proper role of credit unions, and
the growth of secondary loan markets.
William R. Keeton is a senior economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Anne D. McKibbin is a
research associate at the bank.I. MAJOR CHANGES IN THE
DISTRICT DEPOSITORY
INDUSTRY SINCE 1979
The period from 1979 to 1996 was one of
dramatic change in the district depository indus-
try—both for the industry as a whole and for
each type of depository institution. By way of
background, this section reviews the basic fea-
tures of the three institutions at the start of the
period. The section then documents and explains
the four major changes in the industry over the
period—the decline in the number of institu-
tions, the decrease in total deposits, the decline
in the deposit share of thrifts relative to banks
and credit unions, and the narrowing of differ-
ences in asset composition.
Basic features of the three institutions
At the start of the period, the district deposi-
tory industry consisted of three types of institu-
tions that differed in ownership, tax status, and
lending and investment powers. First were com-
mercial banks, which were owned by their
shareholders and subject to federal and state
income tax. Commercial banks were prohibited
from holding common stocks or junk bonds, but
otherwise faced few restrictions on their loans
and investments. Most banks took advantage of
this freedom to diversify their portfolios, hold-
ing both a wide mix of loans and substantial
amounts of securities.
Second were thrifts, which in Tenth District
states consisted entirely of savings and loan
associations.
1 Some associations were stock
associations owned by their shareholders, but
most were mutuals, which meant that they were
legally owned by their depositors. Despite their
different form of ownership, mutual associa-
tions were subject to federal and state income
tax, just like commercial banks and stock asso-
ciations. Having been created to promote the
housing industry, thrifts were required to hold
most of their assets in the form of residential real
estate loans. In return, they received certain tax
benefits and the right to borrow at favorable
terms from the Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLBs), a system of lenders owned by thrifts
but sponsored and supervised by the federal
government.
The last group of depository institutions were
credit unions, organizations designed to enable
individuals with a “common bond” (e.g., a com-
mon employer or area of residence) to borrow
from and lend to each other. Credit unions were
mutual organizations owned by their members
and, unlike commercial banks and thrifts, were
not subject to federal or state income tax. They
could make either consumer loans or home
mortgage loans. But because the authority to
make home mortgage loans had been granted
only recently, credit unions still specialized
heavily in consumer loans at the beginning of
the 1980s—especially loans for the purchase of
automobiles.
Despite their differences, banks, thrifts, and
credit unions shared four important charac-
teristics that distinguished them from other
financial institutions. First, banks, thrifts, and
credit unions earned most of their profits through
financial intermediation—they collected depos-
its from households and businesses and then
loaned those funds to borrowers at higher inter-
est rates. Second, the deposits of all three insti-
tutions were federally insured, with each
institution covered by an insurance fund built up
through annual premiums. Third, all three insti-
tutions enjoyed access to the payments system,
in the sense that they could clear payments
directly through accounts held at the Federal
Reserve.
2 And finally, all three institutions were
regulated and supervised by the federal govern-
ment, partly because of their access to the pay-
ments system and partly because the federal
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system. These common characteristics, which
banks, thrifts, and credit unions continue to share
today, provide the main justification for treat-
ing the three institutions as a single industry.
Decline in the number of depository
institutions 
The first major change in the district deposi-
tory industry since 1979 has been a significant
decline in the number of depository institu-
tions—a decline in which banks, thrifts, and
credit unions have all shared. From the end of
1979 to the end of 1996, the total number of
depository institutions headquartered in Tenth
District states fell by about a third—from a little
less than 4,300 at the start of the period to just
over 2,800 at the end (Table 1). The biggest
proportional decline was in the number of
thrifts, which fell by 67 percent. But there were
also sizable declines in the other two institu-
tions—33 percent for banks and 26 percent for
credit unions.
The main cause of the decline in institutions
was the large number of mergers (Table 2). Over
the period as a whole, 1,140 banks and 126
thrifts were lost through mergers. Bank mergers
increased over the period and were especially
high in the 1990s. Three-fifths of bank mergers
were with banks in the same holding company,
while the rest were with banks in other organi-
zations. In contrast to bank mergers, thrift merg-
ers were concentrated in the first half of the
1980s. All thrift mergers in the 1980s were with
other thrifts, but a quarter of thrift mergers in the
1990s were with commercial banks. Data are not
available on the number of credit unions merg-
ers in the district. For the nation as a whole,
however, mergers were the main factor behind
the decline in credit unions, and there is no
reason to believe the district experience was
different (Amel).
Several factors contributed to the high number
of mergers in the district.
3 First, geographic bar-
riers to consolidation were relaxed substantially
during the period. All seven states moved to
some form of statewide branching in the late
1980s and early 1990s, encouraging both the
consolidation of banks within the same holding
company and mergers among banks in different
holding companies. Legislation enacted by
Table 1
NUMBER OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
Tenth District states, end of year
1979 1996 Percent change
Banks 2,767 1,854 -33
Thrifts 379 126 -67
Credit unions 1,140 845 -26
All 4,286 2,825 -34
Note: Data are for institutions headquartered in Tenth District states.
Source: Reports of Income and Condition for banks, Thrift Financial Reports for thrifts, and Statement of Financial
Condition for credit unions.
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mergers, by permitting statewide branching by
all federally chartered thrifts.
4 Second, the
heavy loan losses suffered by banks and thrifts
in the 1980s focused attention on reducing credit
risk through geographic diversification—for
example, by combining banks or thrifts from
different economic regions of the same state.
Third, increased competition from outside the
depository industry, a factor discussed in the
next section, encouraged institutions in the same
market to merge with each other to eliminate
overlap in branches and backoffice facilities and
thereby cut costs. Finally, credit union mergers
were spurred by two special factors—the large
number of credit unions that were too small to
be economically viable, and new regulations
adopted in 1982 that allowed credit unions with
different common bonds to merge.
5
Besides mergers, the other reason for the
decline in district depository institutions was
the large number of failures. Over the period as
a whole, 284 banks and 131 thrifts were lost
through failures.
6 Most bank failures were in the
second half of the 1980s, while most thrift fail-
ures were in the 1990s. While smaller than bank
failures in absolute terms, thrift failures were
much more important in proportional terms.
Specifically, thrifts lost through failures were 35
percent of thrifts operating at the start of the
period, while banks lost through failures were
Table 2
LOSS OF BANKS AND THRIFTS THROUGH MERGERS AND FAILURES
Tenth District states, 1980-96
1980-84 1985-89 1990-96
Entire
 period 
1.Number lost through mergers
a. Commercial banks 46 351 744 1,141
i. Mergers with affiliated banks 34 238 428 700
ii.Mergers with unaffiliated banks 12 113 316 441
b.Thrifts 75 11 40 126
i. Mergers with other thrifts 75 11 29 115
ii.Mergers with banks 0 0 11 11
2.Number lost through failures
a. Commercial banks 15 225 44 284
b.Thrifts 12 28 91 131
Note: Data are for institutions headquartered in Tenth District states. Failures exclude failed institutions succeeded by
new institutions.
Source: National Information Center Database, Office of Thrift Supervision, RTC press releases.
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the period.
The high rate of bank failures in the 1980s
resulted from a severe downturn in the district
economy. Simultaneous slumps in agriculture
and energy in the mid-1980s led to heavy loan
losses at farm and energy banks. Later in the
decade, overbuilding and the removal of tax
incentives contributed to a collapse in commer-
cial real estate prices, causing some urban banks
to suffer heavy losses on their commercial real
estate loans. While the deteriorating economy
was the main cause of the increased bank fail-
ures, excessive risk-taking also played a role. In
an effort to win business, some banks lowered
their credit standards during the previous boom,
causing them to suffer especially heavy losses
when the economy turned downward (Keeton
and Morris). 
While most thrift failures were in the 1990s,
the seeds of these failures were sown in the
1980s (Brumbaugh, White, National Commis-
sion). The debacle began with a sharp hike in
short-term interest rates at the start of the
1980s. The liabilities of thrifts consisted mainly
of short-term deposits, while their assets con-
sisted mainly of long-term mortgages. Thus,
when short-term interest rates climbed, thrifts’
interest expense rose much more than their in-
terest income, causing heavy losses and eroding
capital. Legislators tried to help by allowing
thrifts to make a wider variety of loans and
investments. It was widely believed that
thrifts had gotten into trouble due to their heavy
dependence on long-term mortgages and that
some diversification into other assets would
make them less vulnerable to future interest
swings. Acting on this belief, Congress passed
laws in 1980 and 1982 that expanded the author-
ity of federally chartered thrifts to invest in
consumer loans, business loans, and commer-
cial real estate loans.
7 Not wanting to be left
behind, a number of states also expanded lend-
ing and investment powers for their state-char-
tered thrifts, sometimes going well beyond the
federal legislation.
Instead of becoming safer, many thrifts used
the new powers to grow rapidly and make risky
loans and investments. Thrifts whose net worth
had been reduced below zero by the jump in
short-term interest rates had a strong incentive
to gamble. If the gambles failed, these thrifts
would be no worse off because they were already
insolvent. And if the gambles succeeded, the
thrifts would be able to stay in business and
recoup their owners’ investment.
8 Most experts
also agree thrift regulators exacerbated the
problem by lowering capital requirements,
encouraging the use of questionable accounting
methods, and failing to adequately supervise
troubled thrifts. The thrifts that took excessive
risks ended up suffering heavy losses in the
second half of the 1980s, especially after the
commercial real estate market collapsed. They
were not closed until the 1990s, however,
because the thrift insurance fund was quickly
depleted and Congress delayed in providing
new funds until August 1989.
9
Decline in total deposits
The second major change in the district deposi-
tory industry since 1979 has been a decline in
total deposits adjusted for inflation or measured
relative to economic activity. Expressed in 1996
prices, the total deposits of banks, thrifts, and
credit unions operating in Tenth District states
fell from $261 billion in mid-1979 to $237 billion
in mid-1996, a decline of 9 percent (Chart 1 and
Table 3). Since the district economy was growing
over most of the period, deposits declined even
more sharply relative to economic activity. For
example, from 1979 to 1994, the last year for
which data are available, the ratio of deposits to
gross state product fell from 0.62 to 0.49, a
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declined does not necessarily mean the district
depository industry has become less important,
because depository institutions could be providing
increased services off the balance sheet (Boyd
and Gertler, Kaufman and Mote).
10 The decline
does suggest, however, a shrinkage in the indus-
try’s traditional role of funding loans with deposits.
One reason for the decline in total deposits
was increased competition from mutual funds.
Households came to view mutual funds as an
attractive alternative to deposits because they
paid open-market returns, were easy to purchase
and liquidate, and provided check-writing privi-
leges. In the early 1980s, most of the mutual
fund competition came from money-market mu-
tual funds (MMMFs), which had grown rapidly
ever since their introduction in the early 1970s
(Chart 2). By the middle of the decade, however,
depository institutions were also facing increased
competition from stock and bond mutual funds.
These funds became more popular partly due to
the rising share of the population between ages
35 and 55—the age group most concerned about
saving for retirement and therefore most willing
to make investments with high short-term risk
but high long-term returns (Morgan). Stock and
bond funds also benefited from an increased
willingness of people in the 35-55 age group to
invest in mutual funds (Laderman). As doubts
arose about the health of social security, these
Chart 1
BANK, THRIFT, AND CREDIT UNION DEPOSITS
Tenth District states, midyear
Source: Summary of Deposits for banks and thrifts; Statement of Financial Condition for credit unions.
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60 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYindividuals became more concerned about sav-
ing for retirement. And as the runup in stock
prices persisted, they became more inclined to
view stocks as good long-term investments.
A second reason for the decline in total depos-
its was an increased supply of credit to house-
holds and businesses from nondepository
sources. The increase in supply was especially
great for mortgage borrowers due to rapid growth
in the secondary mortgage market (Chart 3).
During the 1980s, home mortgage loans were
increasingly pooled and sold to investors in the
form of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).
Housing credit agencies owned or sponsored by
the federal government played a key role in
promoting this market, both by issuing MBSs
directly and by providing guarantees that
made it easier for private parties to issue them.
11
Another important factor was the introduction
of collateralized mortgage obligations, which
were attractive to many investors because they
had more predictable cash flows or different
effective maturities than the underlying pool of
mortgages. These developments caused MBSs
to become increasingly popular with investors
such as mutual funds and life insurance compa-
nies, significantly increasing the supply of funds
to the mortgage market. The increased supply of
mortgage funds pushed mortgage rates down,
reducing the profitability of funding mortgages
with deposits and causing depository institu-
tions to become less aggressive in bidding for
deposits (GAO 1991a, Cotterman, McNulty).
12 
Nondepository sources also supplied increas-
ing amounts of credit to consumer and business
borrowers, although the change was less dra-
matic than for mortgage borrowers. In the case
of consumer credit, the key development was
the emergence in the late 1980s of a market for
securities backed by pools of credit card loans
and automobile loans. This market grew rapidly
in the 1990s, increasing the supply of credit from
Table 3
DEPOSITS IN CONSTANT DOLLARS
Tenth District states, midyear
(billions of 1996 dollars)
1979 1996 Percent change
Banks 175.9 187.7 7
Thrifts 77.6 31.7 -59
Credit unions 7.9 18.0 128
All 261.4 237.4 -9
Note: Bank and thrift data are for all institutions with offices in Tenth District states, including institutions headquar-
tered outside the district. Credit union data are for institutions headquartered in Tenth District states.
Source: Summary of Deposits for banks and thrifts; Statement of Financial Condition for credit unions.
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ity of funding consumer loans with deposits.
13
By 1996, however, securitization had still pro-
gressed only half as far for consumer loans as
home mortgages, limiting the impact on deposit
growth. In the case of short-term business
credit, depository institutions had to compete
against finance companies for small business
loans and against the commercial paper market
for large business loans. Competition from
both sources increased during the 1980s. Com-
pared to home mortgages and consumer loans,
however, the secondary market for business
loans remained much less developed, allowing
depository institutions to hold their own dur-
ing the 1990s.
14
A third reason deposits declined was that fail-
ures imposed substantial costs on surviving
institutions, reducing their profits and dulling
their appetite for deposits. The most obvious
cost of failures was the higher insurance pre-
mium paid by surviving institutions to replenish
the deposit insurance funds. The thrift insurance
premium was increased in 1989 and was not
lowered until the fall of 1996, when Congress
imposed a substantial one-time assessment to
recapitalize the thrift insurance fund to the
mandatory target of 1.25 percent of insured
deposits.
15 The bank insurance premium was
raised in 1991, after a jump in failures at large
banks had depleted the bank insurance fund.
The higher bank premium remained in effect
Chart 2
MUTUAL FUND SHARES HELD BY HOUSEHOLDS
United States, end of year
Source: Board of Governors, Flow of Funds
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reached the 1.25 percent target, helped by an
unexpectedly strong banking recovery that
reduced failures to virtually zero. 
Some analysts argue that surviving institu-
tions also had to bear indirect costs in the form
of tighter supervision and regulation, although
this point is more controversial. In an effort to
limit deposit insurance losses, Congress enacted
a new system of regulation in 1991 that penal-
ized poorly capitalized banks and rewarded
well-capitalized banks.
16 The new system came
on top of risk-based capital requirements,
adopted two years earlier as part of an interna-
tional effort to harmonize capital standards.
Those analysts who blame tighter regulation for
the decline in total deposits argue that such meas-
ures forced banks to hold too much capital,
putting them at a disadvantage relative to unregu-
lated financial institutions (Golembe). Other
analysts disagree, arguing that higher capital
requirements merely corrected the disincentive
to hold capital due to deposit insurance (Litan).
17
Finally, while not the main cause of the
decline in deposits, the large number of failures
may have allowed the depository industry to
adjust faster to its new equilibrium size. Over
time, an industry with declining profits can be
expected to shrink until it is small enough to
become profitable again. That process may take
Chart 3
SECURITIZED LOANS
United States, end of year
Source: Board of Governors, Flow of Funds
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1997 63considerable time, however, if the industry’s
human and organizational capital cannot be eas-
ily transferred elsewhere—-for example, if
managers and employees have skills that are
highly specific to the industry. In such a situ-
ation, an increase in failures due to other factors
may hasten the adjustment process by forcing
human and organization capital to exit the indus-
try more quickly. In the depository industry, for
example, the rapid growth of secondary mortgage
markets reduced the profitability of funding
home mortgages and MBSs with deposits. Much
of the decline in this activity did not occur until
the 1990s, however, when the thrifts that took
excessive risks in the 1980s were finally closed.
If the thrift debacle had never occurred, the
adjustment of the depository industry to the
securitization of home mortgages might have
taken even longer.
Decline in thrift deposit share
The third major change in the district deposi-
tory industry has been a steep decline in the thrift
deposit share relative to that of banks and credit
unions. The contraction in total deposits from
1979 to 1996 was not shared equally by the three
institutions. Adjusted for inflation, deposits fell
59 percent at thrifts but rose 7 percent at banks
and more than doubled at credit unions (Chart 1
and Table 3). As a result of these differences in
deposit growth, the deposit shares of the three
institutions changed radically. Specifically, the
thrift share plummeted from 30 percent to 13
percent, the bank share jumped from 67 percent
to 79 percent, and the credit union share rose
from 3 percent to 8 percent (Table 4). By the end
of the period, commercial banks were by far the
dominant institution, and thrifts held only a
small lead over credit unions.
At first glance, an obvious explanation for
the sharp decline in the thrift deposit share was
that large numbers of thrifts failed due to exces-
sive risk-taking in the 1980s. The decline in the
thrift deposit share occurred entirely in the
1990s, the same period during which most
high-flying thrifts were closed. Furthermore,
the deposits of these failing thrifts totaled $36
billion in 1989, an amount equal to two-thirds
of the total decline in thrift deposits during the
1990s. Such evidence would seem to suggest
Table 4
DEPOSIT SHARES
Tenth District states, midyear
(percent)
1979 1996 Change
Banks 67 79 12
Thrifts 30 13 -16
Credit unions 3 8 5
All 100 100 0
Note: Deposit data are the same as in Table 3.
64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthat the decline in the thrift deposit share was
mainly due to failures.
There are two problems with this explanation
for the decline in the thrift deposit share. First,
it begs the question why the deposits of failed
thrifts did not stay in the thrift industry. In prin-
ciple, the many healthy thrifts that remained in
business could have acquired the deposits of
the failed thrifts, limiting the decline in total
thrift deposits. In fact, however, healthy
thrifts ended up directly acquiring only $5 bil-
lion of the deposits of failed thrifts (Table 5).
The remaining $30 billion of deposits were paid
off by regulators, assumed by commercial
banks, or withdrawn by depositors while the
thrifts were waiting to be closed. Second,
healthy thrifts not only refrained from assum-
ing the deposits of failed thrifts but also lost a
substantial amount of deposits of their own.
Specifically, healthy thrifts lost $16 billion
through deposit outflows and gave up another
$8 billion in deposits to the banking industry
through mergers, charter conversions, and
branch purchases.
The main factor behind the decline in the
thrift deposit share was not the large number of
failures but the rapid growth of the secondary
mortgage market, which reduced the profit-
ability of funding home mortgages with depos-
its. This change affected all three types of
depository institutions but had an especially
large impact on thrifts. Thrifts invested a much
Table 5
SOURCES OF CHANGE IN THRIFT DEPOSITS
Tenth District states, June 1989 to June 1996
Billions of 1996 dollars
1. Failing thrifts
RTC payoffs -3.0
Assumption of deposits by healthy thrifts -5.3
Assumption of deposits by banks -17.2
Deposit outflows before closure -10.3
Net change -35.8
2. Healthy thrifts
Assumption of deposits from failed thrifts 5.3
Absorption of deposits by banking industry -8.4
Charter conversions -2.4
Mergers -2.5
Branch purchases -3.4
Deposit outflows -15.6
Net change -18.6
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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gages than banks or credit unions. And because
most of their expertise was in home mortgage
lending, thrifts could not easily shift out of home
mortgages into business or consumer loans. Thus,
healthy thrifts could not invest their funds prof-
itably enough to hold on to their existing deposits,
much less acquire the large amounts of deposits
released by failed thrifts during the early 1990s.
While failures were not the main reason for
the decline in the role of thrifts, they still con-
tributed to that decline. If commercial real estate
losses had not led to the closure of so many
thrifts, the impact of the secondary mortgage
market on the thrift deposit share might have
taken longer to show up, as thrifts earning sub-
par profits only gradually contracted or exited
the industry. The large number of failures also
contributed to the decline in the thrift deposit
share by imposing an especially heavy financial
burden on those thrifts that survived. Bank and
thrift insurance premiums were increased by
similar amounts to rebuild the two insurance
funds. But because the thrift insurance fund was
in much worse condition, it was widely expected
that thrifts would have to pay the higher pre-
mium for many more years than banks. This
expectation tended to slow deposit growth at
healthy thrifts even before 1995, when the bank
premium was reduced to zero and the thrift
premium left unchanged.
The steep decline in the thrift deposit share
was mirrored by increases in both the bank
deposit share and the credit union deposit share.
The rise in the bank deposit share was mainly a
reflection of the problems in the thrift industry.
While bank deposits did increase over the period
after adjustment for inflation, they increased
only modestly (Table 3). And relative to the size
of the district economy, bank deposits fell
slightly.
18 The increase in the credit union deposit
share was a different matter, resulting more from
the strong growth in credit union deposits over
the period than the weak growth in thrift deposits.
One reason credit unions grew so rapidly was
that they began offering a wider array of services
to their members. In 1977, Congress had author-
ized credit unions to make home mortgage loans
and credit card loans. Further increases in mort-
gage powers came in 1982, when Congress
authorized the refinancing of first mortgages and
extended maturity limits on second mortgages,
and in 1988, when regulators allowed credit
unions to invest in mortgage-backed securities.
During the 1980s, credit unions took advantage
of these powers to offer a wider variety of loans,
increasing their attractiveness to potential mem-
bers. The opportunity to make a wider variety of
loans and investments also boosted profitability,
enabling credit unions to pay higher returns on
their deposits. Finally, credit unions were helped
in their effort to attract members and deposits by
1980 legislation authorizing them to offer trans-
actions accounts, a move that put them on a par
with banks and thrifts.
The other factor behind the rapid growth in
credit union deposits was a significant relaxa-
tion in credit union membership requirements.
In 1982, regulators allowed credit unions to
have members with different common bonds—
for example, an occupational credit union could
accept groups of members from different firms
than the credit union’s original or “core” mem-
bers. The purpose of this change in membership
requirements was twofold—to make it easier for
financially troubled credit unions to merge with
healthy credit unions, and to expand total credit
union membership. The change in policy was
attacked in the courts by the banking and thrift
industries, which argued that credit unions were
deviating from their original purpose by accepting
unrelated groups of members. Until mid-1996,
however, these legal challenges met with little
success.
66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYNarrowing of differences in asset
composition
The last change in the district depository indus-
try is that the three institutions do not look as
different in the composition of their assets
because banks and credit unions have shifted
into real estate loans and securities (Table 6). At
district thrifts, the shares of commercial real
estate loans and residential real estate loans fell
from 1979 to 1996, while the share of mortgage-
backed securities rose. Total real estate assets
changed only slightly, however, edging down
from 85 percent to 84 percent. In contrast, the
share of real estate assets in bank and credit
union portfolios increased substantially over
the period. Bank holdings of mortgage-backed
securities were not reported in 1979 but were
probably negligible. Assuming this to be the
case, the share of real estate assets jumped from
13 percent to 35 percent at commercial banks
and from 5 percent to 21 percent at credit unions.
Table 6
COMPOSITION OF ASSETS AT DISTRICT DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
End of year (percent)
1979 1996 Change
Banks Thrifts
Credit
unions Banks Thrifts
Credit
unions Banks Thrifts
Credit
unions
L o a n s 5 48 56 95 96 66 7 5 - 1 8- 3
Residential RE  7 71 5 14 54 17 7 -17 12
Commercial RE 6 11 __ 11 8 __ 5 -4 __
Consumer 14 2 65 13 4 49 -1 2 -15
O t h e r 2 7** 2 111 - 711
I n v e s t m e n t s 3 01 12 63 13 02 9 11 9 2
M o r t g a g e - b a c k e d _ _309 2 34 _ _ 1 94
Other __ 8 26 22 7 25 __ -1 -2
All other assets  16   5   4  10   4   5  -6  -1  0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100  0  0  0
Memo: Real estate assets 13 85 5 35 84 21 21 -1 16
* Less than 0.5 percent.
† Data are for 1980.
Note: Data are for institutions headquartered in Tenth District states. Consumer loans for 1996 include home equity
loans. Real estate assets are the sum of residential real estate loans, commercial real estate loans, and mortgage-backed
securities (if available).
Source: Reports of Income and Condition for banks, Thrift Financial Reports for thrifts, and Statement of Financial
Condition for credit unions.
†
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far more dependent on real estate assets than
banks or credit unions, but the difference was
not as great as at the start of the period.
In the case of banks, the main impetus for the
shift into real estate assets was a reduction in
the attractiveness of farm and business lending
following the agriculture and energy slumps of
the mid-1980s. The heavy losses suffered by
banks on their farm and business loans in the
second half of the 1980s made such loans
appear riskier. Farms and businesses also became
more reluctant to take on debt, reducing the
demand for bank loans. As a result, the amount
of farm and business loans held by district banks
declined sharply.
19 This decrease in farm and
business lending naturally lead district banks to
look for alternative investment opportunities.
Why did banks turn to real estate assets as a
substitute for farm and business loans? Com-
mercial real estate loans were a natural choice
because they were similar in some respects to
business loans and because slow growth in the
secondary market had limited the supply of
credit from nondepository sources. To be sure,
many banks suffered losses on their commercial
real estate loans in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Once commercial property prices began
to rebound in the early 1990s, however, com-
mercial real estate lending became profitable
again. The motives for banks shifting into home
mortgages are less clear. It was argued above
that securitization reduced the profitability of
funding home mortgages with deposits, contrib-
uting to both the shrinkage in total deposits and
the decline in the deposit share of thrifts. In such
circumstances, banks might have been expected
to cut back on their home mortgage holdings
instead of increasing them.
There are several reasons banks may have
shifted into home mortgages, even as securi-
tization was lowering the average return on such
investments. First, investing in mortgages was a
way for banks with few such assets to diversify
their loan portfolios, reducing the variability of
profits.
20 Such diversification may have seemed
especially attractive to banks in the 1980s in
view of their heavy loan losses on other types of
loans. Second, banks with few mortgage hold-
ings may not have fully exploited their inherent
advantages in attracting and identifying credit-
worthy mortgage borrowers. These advantages
included the opportunity to cross-sell mort-
gages to existing customers and the ability to
identify good risks based on customers’ check-
ing accounts and consumer loan histories. Fi-
nally, large amounts of home mortgages
became available to banks in the 1990s when
failed thrifts were closed and healthy thrifts
agreed to be acquired. Some of these thrifts
may have been earning healthy profits on their
mortgages but gone out of business for other
reasons—for example, because of losses on
commercial real estate loans. In such cases,
banks would have had an incentive to acquire
the mortgages. 
Home mortgages held similar attractions for
credit unions, although they were motivated
more by a desire to attract members than by a
need to find new investment outlets. Credit
unions did not begin to shift into home mort-
gages until the mid-1980s, long after the 1977
law authorizing them to make such mortgages.
Some observers have suggested credit unions
were spurred to reduce their dependence on
consumer loans by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
which ended the tax deductibility of interest
payments on auto loans and unsecured con-
sumer loans. Others have argued that increased
competition from banks and finance companies
reduced the attractiveness of consumer lending,
encouraging credit unions to look for new
ways to invest their rapidly growing deposits
(GAO 1991b). While these factors may account
68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYfor some of the shift, credit unions were prob-
ably more motivated by a desire to increase
membership by becoming full-service finan-
cial institutions. The relaxation of the common
bond requirement in the early 1980s greatly
increased the potential for membership
growth. Offering a wider array of services to
members, including home mortgage lending,
was an obvious way for credit unions to realize
that potential.
II. THE DEPOSITORY INDUSTRY AT
A CROSSROADS
Depository institutions in the district are at a
crossroads, with major changes in store. Long-
standing differences in bank and thrift powers
are likely to disappear as Congress merges the
two charters. And as credit unions become more
like banks and thrifts, they may find it harder to
retain their special privileges. Finally, the secu-
ritization trend is likely to continue, making it
harder for all three institutions to earn profits by
funding loans with deposits. This section briefly
reviews these factors and discusses their impli-
cations for the district depository industry.
Merging the bank and thrift charters
Most analysts believe Congress will soon
eliminate the separate thrift charter, requiring
thrifts to operate under the same rules and regu-
lations as banks. Such a change could affect both
the ability of district banks and thrifts to com-
pete against other financial institutions and the
relative roles of the two institutions in the dis-
trict depository industry. When Congress passed
legislation to recapitalize the thrift insurance
fund in the fall of 1996, it not only levied a
substantial one-time assessment on thrifts but
also required banks to share the burden of
repaying past borrowings. In return, Congress
promised to come up with a plan for merging the
bank and thrift charters, a move the banking
industry had long sought on grounds that thrifts
enjoyed unfair advantages over banks. Rein-
forcing the push for charter merger was a grow-
ing sentiment among financial experts and
regulators that a separate thrift industry was no
longer needed to promote housing, thanks to the
rapid growth of secondary mortgage markets
(Greenspan).
The bank and thrift charters now differ in three
principal ways (Congressional Budget Office,
FDIC). First, most thrift holding companies can
engage in virtually any activity, while bank
holding companies can engage only in activities
closely related to banking. For example, thrifts
can be owned by insurance firms, securities
firms, and commercial and industrial firms,
while banks can be owned only by companies
whose principal activity is banking. Second,
thrifts can own subsidiaries that engage in
activities such as real estate development and
insurance that are restricted for banks.
21 And
third, thrifts are subject to much stricter limits
on the types of loans and investments they can
make. Although these limits were loosened in
the early 1980s, they were tightened again as the
thrift debacle worsened. As a result, thrifts still
have much less latitude to invest in business,
consumer, and commercial real estate loans than
banks do.
22 
How the first two differences in charters are
resolved could affect the ability of banks and
thrifts to compete with other financial insti-
tutions and, thus, affect the ultimate size of
the depository industry. Two very different
approaches have been suggested. Under the
“chartering up” approach, banks and thrifts
would be granted relatively broad holding com-
pany and subsidiary powers—powers similar to
those that thrifts now enjoy. Under the “charter-
ing down” approach, banks and thrifts would be
given only narrow holding company and sub-
sidiary powers—powers similar to those now
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banks and thrifts to offer one-stop shopping for
their customers—for example, providing busi-
nesses with underwriting services as well as
short-term credit, and supplying households
with insurance as well as consumer loans, home
mortgages, and deposit services. On the other
hand, chartering down would restrict the range
of services banks and thrifts could offer, limiting
their ability to compete with other financial
institutions. 
While merger proposals differ in their treat-
ment of holding company and subsidiary pow-
ers, all of them would allow thrifts to make the
same kinds of loans and investments that banks
now do. Thus, besides affecting the size of the
depository industry, a merger of the two charters
could have profound effects on the relative roles
of banks and thrifts in the depository industry.
Specifically, some analysts argue that banks and
thrifts will become indistinguishable once all
legal and regulatory distinctions are removed,
engaging in the same activities and holding the
same loans and investments.
The large differences in asset composition that
now exist between banks and thrifts are likely to
narrow once the two charters are merged, but
there are three reasons to believe the differences
will not disappear altogether. First, while there
are benefits from diversification, there are also
advantages to specialization. A highly diversi-
fied lender is likely to have more stable profits
than a specialized one, because the diversified
lender can use profits on one type of lending to
offset losses on another. But a specialized lender
may be able to earn a higher average level of
profits than a diversified one, because econo-
mies of scale may enable the specialized lender
to do a better job of evaluating borrowers and
serving customers. In the absence of any restric-
tions on loans and investment, some depository
institutions would probably choose to specialize
and some to diversify, just as retailers do. And
since thrifts have already developed expertise in
mortgage lending, it stands to reason that a
higher proportion of thrifts than banks would
end up specializing in such lending.
A second reason for believing thrifts will not
abandon their specialization in home mortgage
loans once a common charter is adopted is the
fact that most thrifts now hold more home mort-
gage loans than required. In the nation as a whole,
for example, four-fifths of all thrifts exceed the
minimum share of housing-related assets estab-
lished by Congress by more than ten percentage
points (FDIC).
23 Looking at the other side of the
coin, most thrifts also hold much smaller
amounts of business, consumer, and commercial
real estate loans than allowed. At the end of
1996, for example, district thrifts held only 1
percent of their assets in business loans and only
4 percent in consumer loans, well below the
legal limits for those loan categories. District
thrifts also held substantially fewer loans secured
by nonresidential real estate and loans for resi-
dential construction than allowed. If thrifts
could not earn profits investing in home mort-
gage loans, they would presumably have invested
in these other types of loans to the maximum
extent allowed.
The last reason for believing many thrifts will
continue to specialize in funding home mort-
gages is that commercial banks have shown this
activity can still be profitable. For example, one
study examined the relative performance of
commercial banks throughout the nation that
held 40 percent or more of their assets in real
estate loans for at least half of the period 1978-
87 (Eisenbeis and Kwast). These banks were
found to be both less risky and more profitable
on average than a control group of similar-size
banks not specializing in real estate loans.
24
Such evidence suggests that well-managed
thrifts may still be able to earn healthy profits
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securitization has made such profits harder to
earn. This conclusion is subject to an important
caveat, however. In the study just cited, banks
specializing in real estate loans held an average
of 45 percent of assets in such investments, much
less than a typical thrift. Thus, while specialization
in real estate loans may still be profitable for
well-managed thrifts, it may be profitable only
on a smaller scale, requiring greater diversifica-
tion into consumer and business loans. 
Defining the proper role of credit unions
There is just as much uncertainty about the
future role of credit unions in the depository
industry as about the future role of thrifts. As
noted earlier, the banking industry mounted
many legal challenges to the relaxation of the
common bond requirement in the 1980s and
1990s. These efforts finally met success in the
summer of 1996, when a federal appeals court
ruled in the case of the AT&T Credit Union that
all members of an occupational credit union
must work for the same employee. The credit
union industry vigorously protested this deci-
sion, and the Supreme Court agreed in 1997 to
consider the case. Meanwhile, banks and thrifts
have stepped up efforts to persuade Congress to
end the tax exemption for credit unions and
subject credit unions to the Community Rein-
vestment Act (CRA)—the law requiring banks
and thrifts to meet minimum standards of serv-
ice to the local community (Murphy, Smale). 
Banks and thrifts argue that credit unions have
strayed from their original purpose of serving
close-knit groups of members and that their
special tax and regulatory treatment gives them
an unfair advantage in competing for customers.
According to this view, either the common bond
requirement should be strictly enforced, or the
tax and CRA exemptions should be eliminated.
Credit unions counter that the relaxation of the
common bond requirement allows them to serve
the employees of small companies who would
be unable to form credit unions on their own.
Credit unions also argue they do not enjoy an
unfair advantage because they are subject to
special requirements that do not apply to banks
and thrifts—for example, the requirement to
lend only to members (Bickley, Stockeld).
The current debate stems from an inherent
dilemma in the credit union movement. The
acceptance of members from different occupa-
tion groups and the expansion of services make
sense from an economic point of view. A credit
union with a diversified membership and a wide
array of services is less vulnerable to a downturn
in a particular industry or sector of the economy.
Furthermore, a credit union that can recruit a
wide variety of members is more likely to grow
large enough to exploit economies of scale in
activities such as check-clearing and credit
evaluation. But the broader the membership
base of credit unions and the greater the extent
to which they duplicate services provided by
banks and thrifts, the harder it is to argue that
credit unions should receive special tax and
regulatory treatment. 
Three outcomes to the debate are possible,
each with different implications for the future
role of credit unions. First, credit unions could
be allowed to keep their tax exemption and other
privileges and continue recruiting members with
different common bonds. Under this outcome,
which maintains the status quo, the market
share of credit unions would probably continue
to grow. Second, credit unions could be allowed
to retain their special privileges but forced to
accept members with a single common bond.
Such a policy would deprive credit unions of
their main source of growth during the 1980s
and 1990s, causing their market share to stabi-
lize or even decline. Finally, Congress could end
the tax exemption for credit unions and subject
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banks and thrifts, establishing a single charter for
all depository institutions. What would happen
under this outcome is less clear. Banks and
thrifts claim that credit unions owe their success
to the tax and CRA exemption and would shrink
without it. But if credit unions are correct that
they provide higher quality services than banks
and thrifts, they should continue to hold their
own even after their special privileges were
eliminated.
Whatever the outcome of the debate, credit
unions are likely to continue specializing in
consumer loans and home mortgage loans. As
long as credit unions retain their tax exemption,
they will be required to lend to members, ruling
out any move into business or commercial real
estate lending. And if the tax exemption were
ended and credit unions allowed to make the
same loans as banks and thrifts, most would
probably continue specializing in consumer and
home mortgage lending because of their accu-
mulated expertise in those areas.
Prospects for further securitization
While the merger of the bank and thrift char-
ters and the outcome of the credit union debate
may alter the structure of the depository indus-
try, the growth of the industry will depend pri-
marily on the progress of securitization. As
noted earlier, depository institutions have lost
considerable ground to mutual stock and bond
funds in the competition for household savings.
That loss in market share has been due partly to
a shift in household preferences from safe
investments to risky investments, as people
have become more concerned about saving for
retirement and less concerned about meeting
sudden cash needs. The main threat to deposit
growth, however, is not a further shift in house-
hold preferences from safe to risky investments.
Rather, the main threat is that securitization will
continue to increase the supply of credit from
investors and nondepository financial institu-
tions to borrowers who now obtain their funds
from depository institutions. Such an increase in
the supply of outside credit would lower the
returns depository institutions can earn on their
loans, preventing them from paying deposit
rates high enough to compete with other safe
investments such as shares in MMMFs.
How far is securitization likely to proceed?
Some analysts believe securitization will extend
beyond home mortgages to virtually all types of
loans now made by depository institutions. For
example, while securitization of consumer loans
has grown rapidly since the mid-1980s, the per-
cent of such loans that are securitized is still less
than half as great as for home mortgages, sug-
gesting considerable room for further growth.
And while secondary markets are much less
developed for commercial real estate loans and
business loans than for consumer loans, some
analysts believe it is only a matter of time before
these loans are securitized as well. As these
loans became more liquid, investors and nonde-
pository financial institutions would become
more willing to hold them, increasing the total
supply of credit. Thus, rates on business loans
would fall relative to market rates, reducing the
profitability of funding loans with deposits. In
such a world, banks, thrifts, and credit unions
that were highly efficient at originating and
servicing loans would continue to prosper. They
would do so, however, by earning fees rather
than attracting and investing deposits.
While such dramatic growth in securitization
cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. One rea-
son the securitization of home mortgages has
progressed so far is because of the encourage-
ment of the federal housing credit agencies,
which are either owned by the federal govern-
ment or viewed by investors as having the
implicit backing of the federal government due
72 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYto government sponsorship. Another reason is
that home mortgage loans are highly stand-
ardized and backed by collateral whose value
can be easily determined, especially when the
loans are pooled in large groups. Federal credit
agencies have not become as involved in the
securitization of other types of loans. Further-
more, while auto loans are well-collateralized,
other types of consumer and business loans are
either unsecured or backed by collateral whose
value depends on the success of the business.
For some types of loans, such as small business
loans, the performance of the borrower must
also be monitored after the loan is granted—a
task the lender may not perform properly unless
it retains a substantial interest in the loan
(Beshouri and Nigro). Thus, while further
growth in securitization can be expected, the
depository industry should still have an impor-
tant role to play in funding loans.
25
III.CONCLUSIONS
The period since 1979 has been one of dra-
matic changes in the depository industry in
Tenth District states. First, there has been a
substantial decline in all three types of deposi-
tory institutions, a development due partly to the
high number of failures but mainly to the high
rate of mergers. Second, the industry as a whole
has shrunk, with deposits falling both in real
terms and relative the district economy. The
main cause of this contraction was increased
competition for loans and deposits from outside
the industry, sparked by rapid growth of mutual
funds and secondary mortgage markets. The
high rate of failures acted as a catalyst, however,
by speeding the exodus of resources from the
industry and imposing substantial costs on sur-
viving institutions. Third, the role of thrifts has
declined sharply relative to that of banks and
credit unions, because outside competition has
increased more for home mortgages than other
types of loans and because thrifts specialized
heavily in home mortgages. Finally, the three
institutions have become more similar in the
composition of their assets, with banks and
credit unions shifting into real estate loans to
diversify their portfolios and exploit the poten-
tial demand for mortgages among their existing
customers.
As significant as these changes have been, still
more appear in store. Congress has promised
to merge the bank and thrift charters, allowing
thrifts to make the same loans and investments
as banks. And recent court decisions have tight-
ened membership requirements for credit un-
ions, threatening to slow their explosive growth.
Finally, the securitization trend is likely to con-
tinue, making it harder for all three institutions
to earn profits by funding loans with deposits.
As these events play out, the long-standing
differences among banks, thrifts, and credit
unions are likely to narrow still further. Many
of these institutions will continue to seek their
own niches, however. And contrary to some
predictions, securitization will not progress so
far that depository institutions lose their inher-
ent advantages over other lenders.
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1 In other parts of the country, thrifts included mutual
savings banks, which had somewhat broader lending and
investment powers than savings and loans associations.
2 Commercial banks have always enjoyed this access.
Thrifts and credit unions were granted access by the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, which also subjected them to the same
reserve requirements as commercial banks.
3 Further details on the causes and consequences of district
bank mergers can be found in Keeton. Besides the mergers
shown in Table 4, there were a substantial number in which
different organizations merged but the banks in each
organization retained their charters. Such mergers are not
shown in the table because they did not reduce the number
of banks.
4 Two other developments contributed to thrift mergers.
First, the thrift bailout legislation passed in 1989
authorized bank holding companies to acquire healthy
thrifts and consolidate them with their subsidiary banks.
And second, regulators authorized all thrifts to branch
across state lines in 1992.
5 Credit unions headquartered in district states had average
assets of only $7 million in 1979 (1996 dollars), compared
to $80 million for banks and $256 million for thrifts.
6 The total number of banks lost through mergers and
failures exceeds the total decline in banks shown in Table
1 by a substantial margin because about 420 banks were
gained through new charters and 90 banks through
conversions from thrifts or uninsured industrial banks.
7 Specifically, the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.
Germain Act of 1982 permitted federally chartered thrifts
to invest up to 30 percent of their assets in consumer loans,
up to 40 percent in commercial real estate loans, up to 11
percent in business loans and corporate debt securities, and
up to 3 percent in “service corporations” set up to finance
real estate ventures.
8 Thrifts inclined to gamble were also helped by a
substantial increase in the deposit insurance limit in 1980
and by the gradual phasing out of deposit rate ceilings
beginning in 1978—two factors that made it easier for risky
depository institutions to raise funds.
9 Specifically, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) authorized $50 billion of
government borrowing to pay for the cleanup and created
a new entity called the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
to expedite the disposition of insolvent thrifts.
10 Examples of these services include originating and
servicing loans sold to other investors, supplying backup
lines of credit, and providing derivative securities such as
interest rate swaps.
11 The two agencies that issued MBSs directly were
FHLMC (“Freddie Mac”) and FNMA (“Fannie May”).
They were government-sponsored enterprises viewed by
investors as having the implicit backing of the federal
government. GNMA (“Ginnie May”), which was wholly
owned by the federal government, promoted the secondary
market by guaranteeing certain kinds of privately issued
mortgage-backed securities.
12 The reduced attractiveness of funding mortgages with
deposits was reflected in a steep decline in the share of
home mortgages held by the depository industry in the
form of either whole loans or MBSs—from over 72 percent
at the end of 1979 to only 47 percent at the end of 1996. It
should be noted that improved secondary markets also
made mortgage investments safer and more liquid for
depository institutions. These positive effects were
outweighed, however, by the decline in mortgage rates due
to increased supply.
13 The decreased attractiveness of funding consumer loans
with deposits was reflected in the share of total consumer
credit held by depository institutions. That share fell from
72 percent at the end of 1979 to 59 percent at the end of
1996, with all the decline occurring after 1988.
14 The share of short-term business credit held by
depository institutions (mainly commercial banks) fell
from 63 percent at the end of 1979 to 51 percent at the end
of 1996, with all but two percentage points of the decline
occurring in the 1980s.
15 The 1.25 percent target was established by Congress in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act (FDICIA) of 1991. Another direct cost of failures to
surviving thrifts was that FIRREA required FHLBs to
contribute part of their net worth and annual earnings to
the thrift bailout. This requirement acted as a tax on thrifts
because the FHLBs were owned by their thrift members
(White).
16 Congress also required regulators to set detailed safety-
and-soundness standards on such matters as management,
74 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYasset quality, and earnings, causing depository institutions
to complain of “micromangement” by regulators. Most of
the detailed safety-and-soundness standards ended up
never being adopted, however—first because regulators
could not agree on standards, and then because Congress
decided to allow regulators to issue general guidelines
instead of quantitative standards (GAO 1996).
17 Through the examination process, regulators also
pressured banks to avoid risky loans and investments in the
early 1990s, contributing to a nationwide slowdown in
lending commonly referred to as the “credit crunch.” It is
unclear, however, how much of the slowdown was due to
regulatory pressure and how much to increased caution on
the part of banks and borrowers. Furthermore, regulators
quit pressuring banks to avoid risky loans and investments
once the severity of the lending slowdown became evident.
18 From 1979 to 1994, the ratio of bank deposits to gross
state product fell from 0.41 to 0.38.
19 Adjusted for inflation, farm loans fell a total of 28
percent over four years (1983-87), while business loans
banks fell a total of 46 percent over eight years (1984-92).
20 Since banks held mostly short-term assets, they could
also increase their mortgage holdings substantially without
having to worry as much as thrifts about interest rate risk.
21 Recent actions by the courts and regulators may cause
this difference in the two charters to become somewhat less
important. Specifically, federal courts have expanded the
authority of national banks to sell insurance, while the
Comptroller of the Currency has ruled that subsidiaries of
national banks can engage in some activities prohibited for
the bank.
22 For example, federally chartered thrifts are currently
subject to limits of 20 percent of assets for business loans,
35 percent for consumer loans, and the greater of 5 percent
of assets or 100 percent of capital for residential
construction loans.
23 This minimum is contained in the Qualified Thrift
Lender test, which requires that thrifts invest at least 65
percent of their assets in housing-related instruments to
retain their greater holding company powers and their
access to credit from the FHLBs. The test was first imposed
in the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 and has
undergone several changes since then.
24 The banks specializing in real estate loans held about
two-thirds of these loans in the form of residential real
estate loans and the rest in the form of commercial real
estate loans. Data for 1996 suggest that the relationship
found in the study also holds for district banks, although
results for a single year must be treated with caution.
Among banks with less than $300 million in assets, return
on assets was 1.57 percent for those with over 40 percent
of assets in residential real estate loans, 1.39 percent for
those with 20 to 40 percent of assets in real estate loans,
and 1.22 percent for those with less than 20 percent of
assets in real estate loans.
25 Some analysts argue that the depository industry may
contract even in the absence of securitization. According
to this view, illiquid loans can just as easily be originated
and held by finance companies that raise funds by selling
commercial paper. A good argument can be made,
however, that deposit insurance gives depository
institutions an inherent advantage over finance companies
in funding illiquid loans—-in contrast to finance
companies, depository institutions do not have to worry
their funding will unexpectedly dry up due to a sudden loss
of confidence by investors.
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